NIS2 Physical Security: The All-Hazards Rule Hiding in Article 21(2)

A client's server room sits behind a door with a keypad code that has not changed since 2019. The cooling is a single wall unit. The fire suppression certificate expired last spring. Their patching is flawless and their MFA is phishing-resistant.
Under NIS2, that client has a gap. And most readiness assessments never see it.
NIS2 physical security starts with one sentence in Article 21(2)
Ask a room of consultants where NIS2 mentions physical security and most will point to the list of ten measures. It is not on the list. It is in the lead-in.
Article 21(2) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 says the measures "shall be based on an all-hazards approach that aims to protect network and information systems and the physical environment of those systems from incidents, and shall include at least the following". The ten measures come after that sentence. They inherit it.
That is the legal basis. Recital 79 adds colour: it refers to physical and environmental security, including protection against unauthorised physical access and against damage to and interference with facilities. A recital is not operative text, but regulators read it when they decide what "appropriate" means.
The consequence is simple. Every one of the ten measures has to be built on an all-hazards basis. Not just cyber threats. Fire, flood, power loss, theft, sabotage, a cooling failure in August.
What "all-hazards" means in practice
All-hazards means you do not start from the attacker. You start from the asset and ask what can stop it working.
For an MSP assessing a client, that turns into a short list of physical questions per site:
- Access. Who can enter the server room, the comms cabinet, the cloud-adjacent colocation cage? Is access logged and reviewed?
- Power. UPS capacity, generator, tested failover. When did anyone last pull the plug on purpose?
- Climate and fire. Cooling redundancy, temperature alerts, detection and suppression, with current inspection dates.
- Water and environment. Is the server room under a bathroom? Below grade? Near a flood plain?
- Disposal. Disks and devices leaving the building. Who signs for them?
- Remote and shared sites. Branch offices, home workers with company laptops, shared coworking racks.
None of this is new engineering. It is the ordinary facilities checklist that cyber teams stopped asking for because nobody owned it.
Article 21 β 10 NIS2 Cybersecurity Measures
Article 21
10 Cybersecurity Measures
Governance & Strategy
Incident & Continuity
Supply Chain & Systems
Technical Controls
People & Assets
Where physical security shows up inside the ten measures
Because the all-hazards sentence governs the whole list, physical controls surface in several measures. Not one.
Business continuity (Article 21(2)(c)). A backup that sits in the same room as the server it protects is not a backup against fire. See our guide on backup and business continuity.
Supply chain (Article 21(2)(d)). The colocation provider and the managed data centre are suppliers. Their physical controls are part of your client's risk. We cover the contract side in the supplier risk assessment guide.
Human resources security, access control and asset management (Article 21(2)(i)). Joiner-mover-leaver processes cover badges and keys as well as accounts. Asset registers should say where each asset physically is. Our Article 21(2)(i) guide goes deeper.
Incident handling (Article 21(2)(b)). A burglary, a flood or a power cut that takes systems down is an incident. Whether it is significant enough to report depends on its impact, not on whether a hacker caused it.
If your assessment template has a separate "physical security" tab that nobody fills in, merge it into these four measures. That is how an auditor will read it.
The audit evidence regulators can ask for
Supervisors do not test the all-hazards sentence in the abstract. They ask for artefacts. Based on the evidence regulators typically request, expect questions like these for physical security:
- A site list showing where critical systems physically run.
- The risk analysis entry covering fire, flood, power and unauthorised access for each site.
- Access logs or badge records for sensitive rooms, plus a periodic access review.
- Maintenance and test records for power, cooling and fire detection.
- Evidence from third-party facilities: certifications, audit reports or contractual commitments.
- A record of the last physical continuity test.
One page per site, with dates, beats a forty-page policy. If the date on the evidence is older than the control it describes, it will not hold up.
The same rule, seven national regimes
The directive sets the floor. Each member state wrote its own transposition, and the status differs widely. Always anchor client advice in the national law, then check that the all-hazards wording is reflected in the guidance your client's regulator actually uses.
- Netherlands. The Cyberbeveiligingswet has applied since 15 August 2026. The separate Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten, which addresses physical resilience of critical entities, was brought into force alongside it.
- Germany. The NIS2 implementation act has applied since 6 December 2025 and amended the BSI Act. Β§30 BSIG carries the risk management measures. The registration deadline has passed.
- Italy. Legislative Decree 138/2024 applies. The ACN's basic measures deadline for listed entities falls on 31 October 2026, so inspections can now begin.
- Poland. The amended KSC Act took effect on 3 April 2026. Compliance obligations apply from 3 April 2027.
- France and Spain. Neither has completed transposition. Both have been referred to the Court of Justice. Clients there still need to plan against the directive text.
NIS2 transposition by country
- AustriaIn force
- In force since October 1, 2026
- Act: NISG 2026 (BGBl. I Nr. 94/2025)
- Registration due December 31, 2026
Authority: Federal Office for Cybersecurity Β· Source
- NetherlandsIn force
- In force since August 15, 2026
- Act: Cyberbeveiligingswet (Stb. 2026, 187)
- Registration required, no transition period
Authority: NCSC (MijnNCSC) Β· Source
- LuxembourgIn force
- In force since May 10, 2026
- Act: Law of 5 May 2026
- Registration due July 10, 2026
Authority: ILR (CSSF for finance) Β· Source
- PolandIn force
- In force since April 3, 2026
- Act: UKSC (Dz.U. 2026 poz. 252)
- Registration due October 3, 2026
- Measures due April 3, 2027
Authority: Minister Cyfryzacji (Wykaz KSC) Β· Source
- PortugalIn force
- In force since April 3, 2026
- Act: Decree-Law 125/2025 (RJC)
Authority: CNCS Β· Source
- BulgariaIn force
- In force since February 13, 2026
- Act: Cybersecurity Act amendment (State Gazette No 17/2026)
Authority: Ministry of e-Government Β· Source
- MaltaIn force
- In force since January 23, 2026
- Act: S.L. 460.41
Authority: Critical Infrastructure Protection Department Β· Source
- SwedenIn force
- In force since January 15, 2026
- Act: SFS 2025:1506
Authority: NCSC-SE Β· Source
- EstoniaIn force
- In force since January 1, 2026
- Act: Cybersecurity Act (KΓΌTS) amendment
- Registration within 3 months
Authority: RIA Β· Source
- GermanyIn force
- In force since December 6, 2025
- Act: NIS2UmsuCG
- Registration due March 6, 2026
- 17,729 registered by June 30, 2026
Authority: BSI Β· Source
- CzechiaIn force
- In force since November 1, 2025
- Act: Act No 264/2025 Coll.
- Registration within 60 days
Authority: NΓKIB Β· Source
- DenmarkIn force
- In force since July 1, 2025
- Act: NIS 2 Act No 434 of 6 May 2025
- Registration due October 1, 2025
Authority: Danish Agency for Societal Security Β· Source
- SloveniaIn force
- In force since June 19, 2025
- Act: ZInfV-1 (OG 40/25)
- Registration within 30 days
Authority: URSIV Β· Source
- CyprusIn force
- In force since April 25, 2025
- Act: Law 60(I)/2025
Authority: Digital Security Authority Β· Source
- FinlandIn force
- In force since April 8, 2025
- Act: Cybersecurity Act 124/2025
- Registration due May 8, 2025
- Measures due July 8, 2025
Authority: Traficom (NCSC-FI) Β· Source
- HungaryIn force
- In force since January 1, 2025
- Act: Act LXIX of 2024
Authority: SZTFH Β· Source
- SlovakiaIn force
- In force since January 1, 2025
- Act: Act No 366/2024 Coll.
- Registration within 60 days
Authority: NBΓ Β· Source
- RomaniaIn force
- In force since December 31, 2024
- Act: GEO 155/2024 (Law 124/2025)
- Registration within 30 days
Authority: DNSC Β· Source
- GreeceIn force
- In force since November 27, 2024
- Act: Law 5160/2024 (Gazette A' 195)
Authority: National Cybersecurity Authority Β· Source
- BelgiumIn force
- In force since October 18, 2024
- Registration due March 18, 2025
Authority: CCB Β· Source
- LithuaniaIn force
- In force since October 18, 2024
- Act: Law No XIV-2902
Authority: NCSC (MoND) Β· Source
- ItalyIn force
- In force since October 16, 2024
- Act: D.Lgs. 138/2024
- Baseline measures due by October 2026 (entities listed in 2025)
Authority: ACN Β· Source
- LatviaIn force
- In force since September 1, 2024
- Act: National Cybersecurity Law
Authority: National Cybersecurity Centre Β· Source
- CroatiaIn force
- In force since February 15, 2024
- Act: Cybersecurity Act (OG 14/2024)
Authority: NCSC (SOA) Β· Source
- FranceNot yet transposed
- Senate adopted the law on March 12, 2025
- Regulator published its framework on March 17, 2026
- Referred to the Court of Justice on July 8, 2026
- Pre-registration open
Authority: ANSSI Β· Source
- SpainNot yet transposed
- Draft bill approved on January 14, 2025
- Referred to the Court of Justice on July 8, 2026
- The NIS1 regime still applies
Authority: CCN / INCIBE Β· Source
- IrelandNot yet transposed
- Referred to the Court of Justice on July 8, 2026
- Bill not yet enacted
Authority: NCSC Ireland Β· Source
Status as of September 28, 2026. Other member states: see the country-by-country timeline.
Why a physical gap costs more than a cyber gap
Under Article 34, member states must make fines for infringing Article 21 or 23 reach at least EUR 10 million or 2% of worldwide annual turnover for essential entities, and at least EUR 7 million or 1.4% for important entities. Those are maximums that national law must allow, not predictions.
The practical point is different. A physical gap is easy to photograph. An inspector who walks into a server room with a propped-open door and an expired extinguisher does not need a log analysis to write the finding.
NIS2 Penalty Escalation β Beyond the Fine
Trigger event
Non-Compliance Detected or Incident Occurs
A supervisory authority identifies a compliance gap or an organisation fails to meet NIS2 requirements
Compliance orders with binding deadlines
Mandatory security audits at your expense
Public disclosure of violations
Binding instructions on specific security measures
Suspension of certifications or operating licences
Temporary ban on management functions for individuals
Public naming of responsible natural persons
A one-hour physical security check for your next client
You can add this to any readiness assessment without a site visit budget:
- List every location that hosts critical systems, including third parties.
- For each, ask four questions: who gets in, what if power fails, what if it burns or floods, what leaves the building.
- Ask for one dated piece of evidence per answer.
- Map every gap to the Article 21(2) measure it belongs to: continuity, supply chain, access control, or incident handling.
- Write the result as a gap, an owner and a date. Not a score.
Run the structured version with the NIS2Certify quick scan, which produces a readiness assessment and gap analysis you can hand to the client.
The takeaway is one sentence long. NIS2 asks you to protect the systems and the physical environment around them, from every hazard. Check the room as well as the network.
Still have a question?
Answers are generated from our articles and are not legal advice. Do not enter personal or confidential data.
